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## Centro de Estudos, Resposta e Tratamento de Incidentes de Segurança no Brasil

CERT Nacional de Último Recurso

#### Serviços Prestados à Comunidade

#### Gestão de Incidentes

- Coordenação
- Análise Técnica
- Suporte à Mitigação e Recuperação

#### Consciência Situacional

- Aquisição de Dados
  - Honeypots Distribuídos
  - SpamPots
  - Threat feeds
- Compartilhamento das Informações

## Transferência de Conhecimento

- Conscientização
  - Desenvolvimento de Boas Práticas
  - Cooperação, Eventos e Reuniões (*Outreach*)
- Treinamento
- Aconselhamento Técnico e Político

#### Filiações e Parcerias:









**SEI**Partner
Network



#### Criação:

**Agosto/1996:** CGI.br publica o relatório "Rumo à Criação de uma Coordenadoria de Segurança de Redes na Internet Brasil"<sup>1</sup>

**Junho/1997:** CGI.br cria o CERT.br (à época chamado NBSO – *NIC BR Security Office*), com base nas recomendações do relatório<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> https://cert.br/sobre/estudo-cgibr-1996.html | <sup>2</sup> https://nic.br/pagina/gts/157

#### Missão

Aumentar os níveis de segurança e de capacidade de tratamento de incidentes das redes conectadas à Internet no Brasil.

#### Público Alvo (Constituency)

Redes que utilizam recursos administrados pelo NIC.br

- endereços IP ou ASNs alocados ao Brasil
- domínios sob o ccTLD .br

#### Governança


Mantido pelo **NIC.br** – Núcleo de Informação e Coordenação do .br

 todas as atividades são sustentadas pelo registro de domínios .br

### O NIC.br é o **braço executivo do CGI.br** – Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil

- entidade multissetorial, coordenada pelo MCTI
- responsável por coordenar e integrar as iniciativas e serviços da Internet no País

https://cert.br/sobre/ https://cert.br/sobre/filiacoes/ https://cert.br/about/rfc2350/






#### Navigate Cybersecurity at Optiv.com



**Navigating the Security Landscape** 

So much technology. So many vendors. Who does what?

https://www.optiv.com/navigating-security-landscape-guide-technologies-and-providers



# DC police surveillance cameras were infected with ransomware before inauguration

Malware seized 70 percent of DC police DVRs a week before Trump's inauguration.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 1/30/2017, 5:12 PM



system just one week before Inauguration Day. *The Washington Post* reports that 70 percent of the DVR systems used by the surveillance network were infected with ransomware, rendering them inoperable for four days and crippling the city's ability to monitor public spaces.



https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/dc-police-surveillance-cameras-were-infected-with-ransomware-before-inauguration/https://www.wired.com/story/police-body-camera-vulnerabilities/

## DDoS attack halts heating in Finland amidst winter

A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack halted heating distribution at least in two properties in the city of Lappeenranta, located in eastern Finland. In both of the events the attacks disabled the computers that were controlling heating in the buildings.

Both of the buildings where managed by Valtia. The company who is in charge of managing the buildings overall operation and maintenance. According to Valtia

circulation were temporarily disabled.




## Building Automation security is not a priority

The devices under attack were built by the company Fidelix. According to company representative Antti Koskinen, there have been other attacks in the CEO, Simo Rounela, in both cases the systems that controlle country before the case in Lappeenranta. He also states to Helsingin Sanomat that when people want convenience and ease of use it often opens up vulnerabilities.

http://metropolitan.fi/entry/ddos-attack-halts-heating-in-finland-amidst-winter

You weren't hacked because you lacked space-age network defenses. Nor because cyber-gurus picked on you. It's far simpler than that Using web application protection vulnerabilities and flaws Three little words: Patches, passwords, policies Bruteforcing credentials used for accessing DBMS 31 🖵 Thu 13 Aug 2020 // 07:06 UTC Bruteforcing credentials for remote access services **Shaun Nichols in San Francisco** Bruteforcing domain user credentials together The continued inability of organizations to patch security vulnerabilities in with software vulnerabilities exploitation a timely manner, combined with guessable passwords and the spread of Bruteforcing credentials for the FTP server automated hacking tools, is making it pretty easy for miscreants, professionals, and thrill-seekers to break into corporate networks. Bruteforcing credentials This is acc 68% -77% Technologi Exploiting vulnerabilities in web application code and found 50% 6% its red tear Exploiting known software vulnerabilities available to 36% Using configuration flaws 29% -Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities 14% https://www.theregister.com/2020/08/13/pentest\_networks\_fail/ https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/external-pentests-2020-eng.pdf

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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers-breached-colonial-pipeline-using-compromised-password



## Cybersecurity INSIDERS

## Insider Threat Awareness Month Reminds Us That the Biggest Threats Can Arise from Within

Posted By cyberinsiders

Insider Threat Awareness Month offers a great opportunity to make organizations realize that today's modern cyberattack is no longer carried out by a dark cyber-assassin with sophisticated hacking techniques. The reality is that they no longer hack in at all, they log in using weak, stolen, or otherwise compromised passwords. And a shocking amount of the time, it is actually an insider doing the "hacking."

https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/insider-threat-awareness-month-reminds-us-that-the-biggest-threats-can-arise-from-within/

## Não são só usuários que comprometem senhas: Desenvolvedores expõe senhas e chaves no GitHub

## **Key Findings**

Unit 42 researchers analyzed more than 24,000 public GitHub data uploads via the GitHubs Event API and found thousands of files containing potentially sensitive information, which included:



https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-data-exposed/

## SolarWinds – Ataque atribuído à Russia pelos EUA **Possível vetor do comprometimento: senha no GitHub**

SolarWinds FTP credentials were leaking on GitHub



More details are emerging about poor security at SolarWinds, following the compromise of its Orion network management software that was then used to effect attacks on many companies in a number of regions around the globe.

A researcher from India had advised SolarWinds in November 2019 that he had found a public GitHub repository which was leaking the company's FTP credentials.

Downloads Url: http://downloads.solarwinds.com FTP Url: ftp://solarwinds.upload.akamai.com

Username: Password:

POC: http://downloads.solarwinds.com/test.txt

I was able to upload a test POC.

Via this any hacker could upload malicious exe and update it with release SolarWinds product.

bounty hunter, said in a tweet: "Was raging SolarWinds. Hmmm, how that d was \*\*\*\*\*123 Rolling on the floor

https://www.itwire.com/security/solarwinds-ftp-credentials-were-leaking-on-github-in-november-2019.html https://threatpost.com/solarwinds-default-password-access-sales/162327/



**TOP 10** Google keys Where leaks 27.6% come from **Development tools** Django, RapidAPI, Okta 15.9% Data storage MySQL, Mongo, Postgres... India 01 15.4% **Uber Data Breach\*** Starbucks Data Breach\* 02 Brazil May 2014 January 2020 Other United States Hackers discovered credentials in a personal JumpCloud API key found in GitHub repository. 03 including CRM, cryptos, identity providers, payments systems, monitoring public repository on GitHub that granted 04 Nigeria access to a database containing private 12% information of thousands of Uber drivers. France \*Read the article \*Read the article Messaging systems Russia Discord, Sendgrid, Mailgun, Slack, Telegram, Twilio... UK 07 11.1% Canada 08 Cloud provider Equifax Data Breach\* **UN Data Breach\*** Bangladesh AWS, Azure, Google, Tencent, Alibaba... 09 April 2020 January 2021 8.4% Indonesia Leaked secrets in personal GitHub account 10 .gitcredentials in a public repository giving granted access to sensitive data for Equifax hackers access to private repositories with sensitive information. customers. Private keys

\*Read the article

State of Secrets Sprawl on GitHub - 2021: <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-2021/">https://blog.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-2021/</a>

\*Read the article

6.7%

Personal data of 16 million Brazilian COVID-19 patients exposed online

The personal and health information of more than 16 million Brazilian COVID-19 patients has been leaked online after a hospital employee uploaded a spreadsheet with usernames, passwords, and access keys to sensitive government systems on GitHub this month.

e affected by the leak are Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro, ers, and 17 provincial governors.





By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | November 26, 2020 -- 21:22 GMT (13:22 PST) | Topic: Coronavirus: Business and technology in a pandemic

## Data of 243 million Brazilians exposed online via website source code

The password to access a highly sensitive Minist database was stored inside a government site's code.

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Since a website's source code can be accessed and reviewed by anyone pressing F12 inside their browser, Estadao reporters searched for similar issues in other government sites.

Reporters said the <u>site's source code contained a username and</u> password stored in <u>Base64</u>, an encoding format that can be easily decoded to obtain the initial username and password, with little to no effort.

https://www.zdnet.com/article/personal-data-of-16-million-brazilian-covid-19-patients-exposed-online/https://www.zdnet.com/article/data-of-243-million-brazilians-exposed-online-via-website-source-code/



#### Intertrust Releases 2021 Report on Mobile Finance App Security

Report of over 150 mobile finance apps reveals a high level of security vulnerabilities across both iOS and Android, highlighting the importance of in-app security

June 02, 2021 12:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time

SAN FRANCISCO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Intertrust, the pioneer in digital rights management (DRM) technology and leading provider of application security solutions, today released its 2021 State of Mobile Finance App Security Report. The report

reveals that 77% of financial apps have at let One or more security flaws were found in every app tested

"Poor financial app security puts bot financial organizations and their customers at risk, especially given the rise in cyberattacks over the course the pandemic. This report shines a li on the ongoing threats and helps finance app vendors understand the importance of building in security mechanisms from day one"

84% of Android apps and 70% of iOS apps have at least one critical or high severity vulnerability

81% of finance apps leak data

49% of payment apps are vulnerable to encryption key extraction

Banking apps contain more vulnerabilities than any other type of finance app

Tweet this

Cryptographic issues pose one of the most pervasive and serious threats, with 88% of analyzed apps failing one or more cryptographic tests. This means the encryption used in these financial apps can be easily broken by cybercriminals, potentially exposing confidential

payment and customer data and putting the application code at risk for analysis and tampering.

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210602005213/en/Intertrust-Releases-2021-Report-on-Mobile-Finance-App-Security



#### Top 10 Most Exploited Vulnerabilities 2016–2019

U.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities by state, nonstate, and unattributed cyber actors from 2016 to 2019 as follows: CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2017-8759, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2018-7600.

#### s Exploited in 2020

on 10 vulnerabilities from 2016 to 2019 listed above, the U.S. orted that the following vulnerabilities are being routinely cated foreign cyber actors in 2020:

- Malicious cyber actors are increasingly targeting unpatched Virtual Private Network vulnerabilities.
  - An arbitrary code execution vulnerability in Citrix VPN appliances, known as CVE-2019-19781, has been detected in exploits in the wild.
  - An arbitrary file reading vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN servers, known as CVE-2019-11510, continues to be an attractive target for malicious actors.
- March 2020 brought an abrupt shift to work-from-home that necessitated, for many organizations, rapid deployment of cloud collaboration services, such as <u>Microsoft Office 365</u> (O365). Malicious cyber actors are targeting

#### Alert (AA20-133A)

#### Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities

Original release date: May 12, 2020









#### Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the broader U.S. Government are providing this technical guidance to advise IT security professionals at public and private sector organizations to place an increased priority on patching the most commonly known vulnerabilities exploited by sophisticated foreign cyber actors.

https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a

#### **Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**

Original release date: July 28, 2021 | Last revised: August 04, 2021









#### Summary

This Joint Cybersecurity (CISA), the Australian Cy (NCSC), and the U.S. Fee

This advisory provides (CVEs)—routinely explo

#### Table 1:Top Routinely Exploited CVEs in 2020

Vendor	CVE	Туре
Cy Citrix	CVE-2019-19781	arbitrary code execution
Pulse	CVE 2019-11510	arbitrary file reading
Fortinet	CVE 2018-13379	path traversal
F5- Big IP	CVE 2020-5902	remote code execution (RCE)
MobileIron	CVE 2020-15505	RCE
Microsoft	CVE-2017-11882	RCE
Atlassian	CVE-2019-11580	RCE
Drupal	CVE-2018-7600	RCE
Telerik	CVE 2019-18935	RCE
Microsoft	CVE-2019-0604	RCE
Microsoft	CVE-2020-0787	elevation of privilege
Netlogon	CVE-2020-1472	elevation of privilege

https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a

#### Precisamos Cuidar do Básico Primeiro:

#### Causas Mais Comuns de Invasões e Vazamentos de Dados

## Ataques mais reportados e mais observados em sensores do CERT.br:

- Acesso indevido via senhas fracas ou comprometidas/vazadas
  - Senhas expostas no Github/Pastebin pelos próprios donos/desenvolvedores dos sistemas
  - Força bruta de senhas em serviços protegidos só com conta e senha. Exemplos:
    - e-mails e serviços em nuvem
    - acesso remoto (VPN, SSH, RDP, Winbox, etc)
    - gestão remota de ativos de rede e servidores
- Comprometimento via exploração de vulnerabilidades conhecidas
  - falta de aplicação de correções
  - erros de configuração
  - falta/falha de processos

#### Mais de 80% dos incidentes seriam evitados se

- todas as correções (patches) fossem aplicadas
- todos os serviços tivessem 2FA / MFA
- houvesse mais atenção a erros e configurações

Estudo Setorial

Segurança digital: uma análise de gestão de risco em empresas brasileiras https://cetic.br/pt/publicacao/seguranca-digital-uma-analise-de-gestao-de-risco-em-empresas-brasileiras/

Você teria um conselho para as empresas para reduzir o número de incidentes?

#### "Multifactor Everything"

-- Katie Moussouris (Luta Security, US) https://youtu.be/4tuC32PlyJk

**Veja também:** Principais Ataques na Internet: Dados do CERT.br <a href="https://youtu.be/nHh8hHaomFE?t=714">https://youtu.be/nHh8hHaomFE?t=714</a>
<a href="https://cert.br/stats/">https://cert.br/stats/</a>

## Todos Tem um Papel na Segurança:

## Ecossistema é Complexo e Interdependente

anterior Defesa Complexidade Técnica Cibernética \ nível Segurança ဓု Cibernética Dependência Segurança na Gestão de Administração de Sistemas Incidentes e Aplicações Segurança no Projeto de Protocolos e no Projeto e Desenvolvimento de

Sistemas e Aplicações

Quase tudo é *software* e está conectado à Internet

#### **Ataques são constantes**


- Motivações diversas
- Volume crescente
  - ferramentas facilitam a perpetração por atacantes não especializados

#### Organizações precisam

- Operar mesmo sob ataque
- Estar preparadas para lidar com estes ataques

Melhora do cenário depende de cada ator fazer sua parte

## MITRE CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures): Número Mensal de Vulnerabilidades Catalogadas




https://www.first.org/epss/data\_stats

## Uma Empresa Consegue Aplicar Todos os Patches?

 Pesquisas mostram que as empresas conseguem <u>aplicar</u>, em média, <u>apenas 10% das correções</u> para vulnerabilidades presentes em suas infraestruturas em um dado mês

#### – Fatos:

- mesmo quando há patches é impossível corrigir tudo
- é necessário melhorar a qualidade do software sendo desenvolvido
  - esse será o diferencial cada vez mais exigido pelo mercado e por regulações




## Como Construir Sistemas mais Robustos e Seguros:

### Engenharia de Segurança

**Security engineering** is about building systems to remain <u>dependable in the face of malice, error, or mischance</u>.

Good security engineering requires four things to come together.

There's <u>policy</u>: what you're supposed to achieve. There's <u>mechanism</u>: the ciphers, access controls, hardware tamper-resistance and other machinery that you assemble in order to implement the policy. There's <u>assurance</u>: the amount of reliance you can place on each particular mechanism. Finally, there's <u>incentive</u>: the <u>motive that the people</u> guarding and maintaining the system <u>have to do their job properly</u>, and <u>also the motive that the attackers have to try to defeat your policy</u>.



Source: Chapter 1: What is Security Engineering?, Security Engineering, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2008, Ross Anderson https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html

## Os exemplos apresentados não são simplesmente "má segurança" Difícil proteger de falhas de projeto e implementação

#### Melhoras na Implantação de Projetos

- não cortar a verba de segurança
- definir requisitos de segurança no início
- autenticação não pode ser só senha
  - 2FA ou, no mínimo, SSH com chave para o que está na Internet
- ter firewall, WAF, proxy e antivírus não garante segurança
- exposição acidental de dados é cada vez mais frequente
  - má configuração de serviços em nuvem
  - falta de instalação de patches
  - erro humano

#### **Melhoras no Ensino**

- permear segurança em todas as disciplinas, mas principalmente em
  - ciência de dados
  - programação e engenharia de software
- não pensar "que alguém vai cuidar da segurança depois"
- considerar casos de abuso
  - esses são os incentivos dos atacantes
- ensinar ceticismo e pensamento crítico
- não criar maus hábitos / memória muscular
  - precisam aprender a usar frameworks e software livre de maneira segura
  - más práticas são difíceis de mudar



## Ética e Impactos na Sociedade: Sempre Há Consequências Não Previstas

Não é porque dá para fazer, que se deve fazer!


- -reflita sobre os <u>impactos éticos e de segurança</u> de uma nova tecnologia
- assuma que alguém vai abusar a tecnologia que você está criando


Sempre se pergunte:

O que poderia dar errado?

#### Referências:

## Segurança de Software (1/2)





The Building Security In Maturity Model

https://www.bsimm.com/




#### Referências:


## Segurança de *Software* (2/2)


#### **CERT Secure Coding**

https://www.sei.cmu.edu/our-work/secure-development/

Wiki com práticas para C, Perl, Java e Java para Android
 <a href="https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/SEI+CERT+Coding+Standards">https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/SEI+CERT+Coding+Standards</a>







#### O Ano é 2021: Passou da Hora de Adotar Protocolos Modernos

Padrões	Referências
Tokens em hardware (FIDO2/U2F)	https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/
Tokens em software (HOTP/TOTP)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4226 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6238
HTTPS mandatório e HSTS Versões atuais de TLS Forward Secrecy	https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ https://ssl-config.mozilla.org https://observatory.mozilla.org https://letsencrypt.org/
DNSSEC	<pre>https://registro.br/tecnologia/dnssec/dnssec-para-provedores/ https://ftp.registro.br/pub/doc/tutorial-dnssec.pdf https://dnsviz.net</pre>
STARTTLS [idealmente c/ DANE] DMARC, DKIM e SPF	https://english.ncsc.nl/publications/factsheets/2019/juni/01/factsheet-secure-the-connections-of-mail-servers https://mecsa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/technical#starttls https://havedane.net https://dmarc.org https://dmarc.globalcyberalliance.org
IPv6	https://ipv6.br https://test-ipv6.com
RPKI	https://bcp.nic.br/rpki



#### Precisamos um Ecossistema mais Saudável:

## Faça a sua parte!





https://bcp.nic.br/i+seg

## Conscientização de Todos é Essencial: **Portal InternetSegura.br – materiais gratuitos**




## Cartilha de Segurança para Internet:

### Fascículos e Slides para Palestras e Treinamento

## Conteúdo disponível *online* gratuitamente sob Licença *Creative Commons*

- Fascículos que cobrem assuntos específicos relacionados com segurança na Internet
- Slides sobre cada um dos temas, que podem ser utilizados, por exemplo, para dar aulas ou palestras de conscientização
  - Dica do dia no site, via Twitter e RSS
  - Impressões em pequena escala enviadas a escolas e centros de inclusão digital
  - Possível gerar versões personalizadas com logo da instituição
    - Exemplos de parceiros de impressão e distribuição: Itaipu, Eletronuclear, ELO, Microsoft, Procergs e Metrô SP































## Obrigada

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