

# Honeynets and Honey pots: Companion Technology for Detection and Response

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<http://www.honeynet.org.br/>

# Overview

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- Some definitions
- Types of Honeypots
  - differences
  - possible uses
- Types of data gathered
  - in a Honeynet
  - in a network of distributed honeypots
- Additional Information

# Honeypot Definition

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“A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised.”

*Lance Spitzner,  
Honeypots: Tracking Hackers.*

# Advantages

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- There is no “normal” traffic. Everything is suspicious and potentially malicious.
- Less data to analyse than in IDS systems
- Can provide valuable information about attackers
- Can capture new types of malware

# Disadvantages

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- There are potential risks for your network (depending on the type)
- Can be time consuming to maintain
- Narrow view – sees only what is directed to it

# What honeypots aren't

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- Honeypots are **not** replacements for:
  - security best practices
  - security policies
  - firewalls
  - IDS
  - patch management

# Types of Honeyypots

# Low-interaction Honeypots

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- Easy to install and maintain
- Low risk
- Limited information gathering
- Examples:
  - listeners, service emulators, honeyd, Tiny Honeypot.



# Low-Interaction Honeypots (cont.)

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- Emulate some parts of services and systems
- The attacker does not have access to the real operating system
- The attacker can't compromise the honeypot (in theory)

# High-interaction Honeypots

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- More difficult to install and maintain
- High risk
- Need containment mechanisms
- Extensive information gathering
- Example:
  - honeynets, virtual honeynets

# Honeynet Definition (1)

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“A Honeynet is nothing more than one type of honeypot. Specifically, it is a high interaction honeypot designed primarily for research, to gather information on the enemy. [...] A Honeynet is different from traditional honeypots, it is what we would categorize as a research honeypot.”

*Lance Spitzner,  
Know Your Enemy: Honeynets*

## Honeynet Definition (2)

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“A honeynet is a research tool consisting of a network specifically designed for the purpose of being compromised, with control mechanisms that prevent this network from being used as a base for launching attacks against other networks.”

*Cristine Hoepers, Klaus Steding-Jessen, Antonio Montes,  
Honeynets Applied to the CSIRT Scenario*

# Honeynets Characteristics

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- A network of multiple systems and applications
- Robust containment mechanism
  - may have multiple layers of control
  - sometimes called “honeywall”
- Data capture and alerting mechanisms

# Honeynet Requirements

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- No data pollution (i.e. no test or traffic generated by non-blackhats)
- Data control
- Data capture
- Data collection
- Alerting mechanism

# Risks

# Low-Interaction Honeypots Risks

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- Compromise of the real operating system running the honeypot
- The honeypot software may have vulnerabilities
- Attract attackers to your network



# Honeynets Risks

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- A mistake in containment or configuration can
  - permit your honeynet to be used to harm other networks
  - open a port to your organization's network
- A compromise associated with your organization can affect its image
- Your honeynet being identified

# Honeynets Risks (cont.)

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Why they are so risky:

- Level of interaction – the attacker has full control of the machine
- Complex to deploy and maintain
  - variety of technologies working together
  - multiple points of failure
- New attacks and unexpected threats may not be contained or seen

# Possible Uses

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- Detect automated probes and attacks
- Capture tools, new worms, etc
- Identify insider's attacks (internal honeypots, honeytokens)
- Compare with IDS and Firewall logs
- Raise awareness
- Identify infected/compromised machines
  - use the data to generate reports

# When to Use

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## Low-Interaction Honeypots

- There is insufficient hardware to set up a honeynet
- The risk of another type of honeypot is not acceptable
- The purpose is:
  - identify scans and automated attacks
  - fool script kiddies
  - distract attackers from important systems
  - collect attack signatures and trends

# When to Use (cont.)

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## High-Interaction Honeypots

- The purpose is to observe the intruders activities and behavior:
  - observe a real compromise
  - IRC conversations
- Need material for research and training in:
  - artifact analysis
  - forensic analysis

# Low x High-Interaction Honeypots

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	Low-Interaction	High-Interaction
Installation	Easy	More difficult
Maintenance	Easy	Time consuming
Risk	Low	High
Need Control	No	Yes
Data gathering	Limited	Extensive
Interaction	Emulated services	Full control

# Some Results



# Data Gathered

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Show some types of data gathered:

- In a HoneyNet of the HoneyNet.BR Project

<http://www.honeynet.org.br/>


- In a Network of Distributed HoneyPots

<http://www.honeypots-alliance.org.br/>

# Data Gathered by Honeynets



## HoneyNet.BR Topology



# Data Gathered by Honeynets (cont.)

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- Network traces of successful attacks
  - update IDS signatures
  - understand attacks
- Profile of intruders
  - modus operandi
  - IRC conversations, motives
  - possible origin

# Data Gathered by Honeynets (cont.)

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- Rootkits, exploits, etc

- Used to update the `chkrootkit` tool

<http://www.chkrootkit.org/>

- New worms

- Scan of the Month Challenge 25 – Analyze a worm recovered by a Honeynet.

<http://www.honeynet.org/scans/scan25/>


- Propagation of "Slapper" OpenSSL/Apache Worm Variants

<http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/alerts/id/advisel34>

# Data Gathered by Honeypots



## Brazilian Honeypots Alliance



# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)

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- Low-interaction honeypots distributed over multiple networks
- Configuration of each honeypot:
  - OpenBSD
  - Honeyd
  - listeners
- Data collection in 2 central points:
  - NBSO/Brazilian CERT
  - CenPRA Research Center

# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)

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- Malware and spybot samples collected using listeners
  - mydoom
  - kuang
  - subseven
- All traffic is logged (not only “SYN” packets)
  - able to see signatures of attacks, scans and worms
  - reduce false positives
- Observe the “noise” of malware activity

## Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)


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- Sanitized data is being used by NBSO to:
  - notify Brazilian networks involved in malicious activity
  - donate data to other CSIRTs interested in notifying their constituents
- Virus and malware are being sent to some AV vendors


The following graphics are based on reports sent by NBSO to Brazilian Networks, in the first quarter of 2004.




# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)




# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)




# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)



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


# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)




Possible Agobot/Phatbot side effect

# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)



# Data Gathered by Honeypots (cont.)



# Additional Information

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- **Honeynet.BR Project**  
<http://www.honeynet.org.br/>
- **Brazilian Honey pots Alliance**  
<http://www.honeypots-alliance.org.br/>
- **The Honeynet Project**  
<http://www.honeynet.org/>
- **Honeynet Research Alliance**  
<http://www.honeynet.org/alliance/>
- **Honeypots: Tracking Hackers**  
<http://www.tracking-hackers.com/book/>
- **Know Your Enemy, 2nd Edition**  
<http://www.honeynet.org/book/>



# Additional Information

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- Honeyd

<http://www.honeyd.org/>

- Honeyd: A Virtual Honeytrap Daemon (Extended Abstract)

<http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/papers/honeyd-eabstract.pdf>

- Honeyd Applied to the CSIRT Scenario

<http://www.honeyd.org.br/papers/hnbr-first2003.pdf>

- Honeyd Challenges

<http://www.honeyd.org/misc/chall.html>

- SecurityFocus Honeyd Mailinglist

<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/>